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RECENT DECISIONS
ANTI-TRUST LAW-SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT-
EXEMPTION OF PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL.
Radovich v. National Football League (9th Cir. 1956).
Plaintiff, a professional football player with the Detroit Lions of the
National Football League, violated his contract by signing with a football
organization outside the league. Later, when he sought re-employment
with the Detroit Lions and other football organizations of the National
Football League he was refused because of the violation of the "reserve
clause" 1 in his contract. He brought action in a federal court for treble
damages under the anti-trust acts, 2 claiming a conspiracy on the part of the
National Football League to eliminate other leagues. The lower court
dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals in affirming the decision
held that the business of providing football exhibitions between rival foot-
ball organizations is not within the scope of the anti-trust laws. Radovich
v. National Football League, 231 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1956).8
With the Supreme Court having rendered decisions regarding the
status of professional boxing 4 and professional baseball 5 under the anti-
trust laws, litigation concerning professional football was inevitable. The
majority opinion in Toolson v. New York Yankees,6 following Federal
Baseball Club v. National League 7 unequivocally stated that Congress, by
its silence, had exempted baseball from the Sherman Act. Although the
1. "Shortly stated, the reserve clause in a player's contract ties the player to his
club and he cannot go to another club without the consent of the club holding his con-
tract." Radovich v. National Football League, 231 F.2d 620, 621 (9th Cir. 1956).
2. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1952). The applicable sections of the
statute are: § 1 "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations is declared to be illegal. . . . Every person who shall make any contract or
engage in any combination or conspiracy declared by sections 1-7 of this title to be
illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and ... shall be punished .. "
§ 2 "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor, and . . . shall be punished. .. ."
3. Radovich v. National Football League, 231 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1956).
4. United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
5. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
6. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
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Toolson case is arguably judicial legislation,8 the fact remains that the
Supreme Court has held that baseball is not within the scope of the federal
anti-trust laws. However, in United States v. International Boxing Club 9
the Court indicates that the Toolson decision is to be limited to baseball.
The Toolson case immunizes neither business built around the live presenta-
tion of local exhibitions, 10 nor such businesses as involve exhibitions of an
athletic nature." Since the Sherman Act applies to service industries,
12
the question arises as to where professional football stands in relation to
the anti-trust laws. Undoubtedly professional football, like baseball, with
its complex organization and activity falls within the language of the
Sherman Act as being both "interstate" and "commerce." 13 However,
considering the Toolson and the International Boxing Club cases together
the conclusion is inevitable that the immunity created by the Court exists
only for baseball. The court in the instant case, in attempting to create
a further exemption from anti-trust legislation departs from a long line of
authority holding that the power to grant exemptions lies with Congress and
not with the courts.14  Congress has exempted certain specific activities
from the Sherman Act,1 5 but professional football is not one of them. The
8. In 1951 a congressional subcommittee indicated its opposition to the introduc-
tion of bills which would grant an exemption "to organized professional sports enter-
prises" under the Sherman Act. The subcommittee stated: "Four bills have been intro-
duced into Congress, three in the House, one in the Senate, intending to give baseball
and all other professional sports a complete and unlimited immunity from the anti-
trust laws. The requested exemption would extend to all professional sports enter-
prises and to all acts in the conduct of such enterprises. The law would no longer
require competition in any facet of business activity of any sport enterprise. Thus
the sale of radio and television rights, the management of stadia, the purchase and
sale of advertising, the concession industry, and many other business activities, as well
as the aspects of baseball which are related to the promotion of competition on the
playing field, would be immune and untouchable. Such a broad exemption could not
be granted without substantially repealing the antitrust laws." H.R. 4229, 4230, 4231,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) ; S. 1526, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) ; H.R. ReP. No.
2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 230 (1951).
9. 348 U.S. 236 (1955). The Toolson case was not followed; it was held that the
promotion of professional championship boxing contests on a multistate basis was
within the Sherman Act.
10. United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 227 (1955).
11. United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 239 (1955).
12. United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485
(1950).
13. For cases defining "interstate" and "commerce," see, United States v. Shubert,
348 U.S. 222, 227 (1955) ; Times-Picayune Publishing Company v. United States, 345
U.S. 594, 602 (1953) ; Lorain Journal v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 151-152 (1951) ;
United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948) ; United States v. Yellow
Cab Company, 332 U.S. 218, 226 (1947) ; Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S.
1 (1945) ; United States v. Crescent Amusement Company, 323 U.S. 173, 183 (1944) ;
American Medical Association v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943) ; Hart v. B. F.
Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 262 U.S. 271, 274 (1923).
14. United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533
(1944) ; United States v. Crescent Amusement Company, 323 U.S. 173 (1944) ; United
States v. Cooper Corporation, 312 U.S. 600, 602 (1941); United States v. Trenton
Potteries Company, 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) ; Northern Securities v. United States,
193 U.S. 197 (1904).
15. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1952) (Labor Organizations) ; 42
STAT. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C. §§ 291, 292 (1952) (Farm Cooperatives) ; 59 STAT. 34
(1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1013 (1952) (Insurance). See also: Apex Hosiery Company
v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 501 (1940) (Labor Organizations).
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instant decision is contrary to a finding of .a congressional subcommittee
concerning the exemption of athletic -exhibitions from the Sherman Act,16
yet, it does not have the justification of the Toolson case that baseball is
our "great national -pastime," nor a decision of thirty years standing on
which to rely.
It is difficult to perceive the instant decision being upheld. If the
decision is allowed to stand on the basis of Judge Chambers' "more like"
test, suggesting that all team sports are immune from the Sherman Act,17
the baseball exemption will extend not only to football but to other pro-
fessional team sports such as basketball and hockey. Yet, it seems safe to
state that the International Boxing Club decision has given fair warning
that the judicial immunity awarded to baseball by the Toolson case is to
be narrowly construed, and will not be afforded to athletic exhibitions of
any other type. 18
Anthony L. Bartolini
BANKRUPTCY-PREFERENCES-SECTION 67(c)-
CHATTEL MORTGAGE AS A STATUTORY LIEN.
In the Matter of Quaker City Uniform Co. (3d Cir. 1956).
The trustee in -bankruptcy sold certain property, subject to two chattel
mortgages, with the consent .of the mortgagees. In distributing the pro-
ceeds of sale the referee declared the following priorities: chattel mort-
gagees' claim; administration expenses; wage claims; and the landlord's
claim for rent. The district court, recognizing the superiority of the land-
lord's lien to the lien of a chattel mortgagee under Pennsylvania law,
amended the order of distribution to read: the landlord's claim for rent;
the claims of the chattel mortgagees; administration expenses; and wage
claims. The court of appeals held that a chattel mortgage is a "statutory
lien" within the meaning of section 67(c) of the Bankruptcy Act and was
thereby postponed to the payment of administration expenses and wage
claims; and secondly, that under Pennsylvania law the landlord's claim
takes priority over the claim of a chattel mortgagee. The order of dis-
tribution then was arranged as follows: administration expenses; wage
16. H.R. REP. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 230 (1951).
17. Radovich v. National Football League, 231 F.2d 620, 622 (9th Cir. 1956).
18. If the decision were to be affirmed it would probably have to rest on the alter-
nate grounds that plaintiff having failed to allege facts showing actual restraint fails
to state a cause of action. Radovich v. National Football League, 231 F.2d 620, 621-
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claims; the landlord's claim; and claims of the chattel mortgagees.. In the
Matter of Quaker City Uniform Co.'
Prior to the adoption of the Chandler Act 2 in 1938 and its. subse-
quent revision in 1952,4 there would, have been no question of a chattel
mortgagee's priority over administration expenses and wage claims in
the order of distribution of. proceeds of the sale of mortgaged assets.4
However, state-created priorities in the guise of liens 5 threatened federal
control of priorities and dictated the revision brought about by section
67(c).8 The revised section postponed "statutory liens" to the payment
of administration costs and wage claims.. Concern then draws.us to ques-
tion the meaning of "statutory liens" as enunciated by section 6 7 (c), and
whether it includes chattel mortgages. There is a paucity of judicial au-
thority on the point.7 The instant case in interpreting the act answers
the question in the affirmative. This resolution avoids the district court's.
1. In the Matter of Quaker City Uniform Co., 135 LEGAL INTZLUIGxNCFR No. 25,
p.1, Col. 3 (3d Cir. July 27,1956).
2. 52 STAT. 874 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1952) ; 52 STAT. 875 (1938), 11 U.S.C.§ 107 (1952). The pertinent parts are: § 64(a) "The debts to have priority, in advance
of the payment of dividends to creditors, and to be paid in full out of bankrupt estates;
and the order of payment, shall be (1). . .[enumerating various administration ex-
penses] ; (2) wages not to exceed $600 to each claimant .... ." § 67(c) "Where not en-
forced by sale before the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding under this title, and
except where the estate of the bankrupt is solvent; (1) though valid against the
trustee under subdivision (b) of this section, statutory liens, including liens for taxes
or debts owing to the United States or to any State or subdivision thereof, on personal
property not accompanied by possession of such property, and liens, whether statutory
or not, of distress for rent shall be postponed in payment to the debts specified in
clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision (a) of section 104 [section 64 of the Bankruptcy
Act] of this title ..
3. 52 STAT. 874 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1952) ; 52 STAT. 875 (1938),
as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 107 (1952).
4. See Ginsberg v. Lindel, 107 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1939) ; Ingram v. Coos County,
71 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1934); In re Brannon, 62 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1933); In re
Edmunds, 27 F. Supp. 196 (W.D. Pa. 1939).
5. "Clause (2) obviously furthers the policy recognized in §§ 64a and 67c as
written into the Chandler Act of 1938, to protect unsecured creditors against state
created priorities and 'floating liens' thought to be essentially indistinguishable from
priorities." 4 CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 195 (14th ed. 1942). Of this type of statute would
be the New York Workman's Compensation Act awarding a lien against assets of the
employer. See Halpert v. Industrial Commissioner, 147 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1945).
6. 4 COLLim, BANKRUPTCY 189 (14th ed. 1942) in analyzing the congressional bill
(H.R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.(1936)) states the policy underlying section 67(c) :
"As a result of long inaction of tax authorities, liens for taxes which had accumulated
over a number of years often consumed a bankrupt's entire estate, even to the exclusion
of costs and expenses of the bankruptcy proceedings. Statistics compiled by the Attorney
General demonstrated that rent liens often consumed a very substantial portion of an
estate and indeed the whole estate if not large. This situation was further aggravated
by the growth of special legislation favoring public and private claims by granting
liens to secure them. To afford protection to administration costs and expenses and to
wage claims, the authors of subdivision b [of § 671 which expressly reaffirmed the
validity of statutory liens, collaborated in a limited subordination of those liens."
7. The court iri In re Consorto Construction Co., 212 F.2d 676, 680 (3d Cir. 1954)
has this to say: "Under the common law of Pennsylvania chattel mortgages were
viewed with disfavor. Any such attempt to mortgage personality which was left in the
possession of the mortgagor did not give the mortgagee any lien or legal priority over
other creditors. . . . This background considered, the Pennsylvania courts have rather
clearly indicated their view that the limited effect of the 1945 Chattel Mortgages Act
has been to create a new statutory lien...." However this is not stated as an interpre-
tation of section 67(c).
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problem of circuity of liens.8 However, in New Orleans v. Harrell,9 a city
tax lien was expressly postponed, as a "statutory lien" under section 67(c),
to the payment of administration expenses and wage claims, while a chattel
mortgagee was allowed full payment from the proceeds of sale of the
mortgaged chattel minus only the estimated cost of foreclosing the mort-
gage. The court then categorically stated that the validity of the chattel
mortgage is undisputed, and that it is unaffected by bankruptcy, 10 clearly
indicating that it does not consider a chattel mortgage as a "statutory lien"
under section 67(c).
Considering the policy 11 underlying the change wrought by section
67 (c) of the Bankruptcy Act, it is difficult to visualize Congress intending
to characterize a chattel mortgage as a "statutory lien." Since a chattel
mortgage was unaffected by the bankruptcy of the mortgagor prior to
1938,12 such a drastic change as the court proposes in the instant case would
make the lack of litigation on the question most difficult to explain. Further,
under the court's interpretation, it is easy to visualize a situation wherein
a chattel mortgagee's security could be exhausted in financing an entire
bankruptcy proceeding. If the court's interpretation of section 67(c) of
the Bankruptcy Act prevails, then the value of a chattel mortgage as a
bankruptcy-proof security device is destroyed.
Anthony L. Bartolini
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDRAL CORRUPT PRACTICEs ACT-
PROHIBITION OF UNION POLITICAL EXPENDITURES.
United States v. International Union United Automobile Workers,
UAW-CIO (E.D. Mich. 1956).
Defendant was indicted for allegedly violating § 610 of the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act.' It was charged that the Union drew a specific
8. Under Pennsylvania law the lien of the landlord is superior to that of the
chattel mortgagee and takes priority. Ferbo Trading Corp. v. Jo-Mar Dress Corp., 78
Pa. D.&C. 337 (C.P.,Lack. 1951); Commercial Credit Plan v. Mahoney, 67 Pa. D.&C.
577 (C.P., Erie 1949). If we say then, that a chattel mortgage is not postponed by
section 67(c), it necessarily follows that it has priority over the landlord's lien which
is expressly postponed. Yet, as stated, the Pennsylvania law gives priority to the land-
lord's lien, thus leading to a circuity of liens. This was solved by the district court in the
instant case by giving the landlord's lien the place of superiority it has under Penn-
sylvania law and ending the circuity there. Granted, it was a rather arbitrary method,
but it certainly seems better than the solution adopted by the court of appeals, for in
ending the circuity the court of appeals destroys the value of the chattel mortgage.
9. 134 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1943).
10. "The validity of the chattel mortgage liens is undisputed and it is well settled
that when property so encumbered is sold in a bankruptcy proceeding for an amount not
exceeding the balance of the mortgage debt, the creditor holding such lien, provided it
is a first lien, is entitled to the entire proceeds of the sale, less only the estimated costs
of foreclosure under the state law." New Orleans v. Harrell, 134 F.2d 399, 400 (5th
Cir. 1943). Accord, In re Danielle Co., 117 F. Supp. 178 (D.C. P.R. 1953).
11. See note 6 supra.
12. See note 4 supra
1. "It is unlawful for ... any labor organization to make a contribution or ex-
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sum from its general treasury to defray the costs of certain union-sponsored
broadcasts from a commercial television station; that the broadcasts ad-
vocated selection by the general electorate of certain persons as -candidates
for representatives and senator to the Congress of the United States in the
primary and general elections of 1954; that the defendant thereby intended
to influence the results of the election; and, further, that the sum paid
was not obtained from voluntary political contributions or subscriptions
from the union members, and was not paid for by advertising or sales.
Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment was granted on the grounds
that the expenditures charged were not prohibited by the Act. United
States v. International Union United Automobile Workers, UAW-CIO,
138 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Mich. 1956).2
Historically, federal legislation has touched this type of politicial
activity in some measure since 1907.3 Federal regulation of political
contributions was early upheld as constitutional.4 Today the real prob-
lem pivots upon the proper construction of the term "expenditure" which
was added as a part of permanent legislation in 1947. 5 As early as
1944 there was some doubt as to the constitutionality of adding the term,6
and, with the advent of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,
a stir of conflicting public opinion raged over the meaning of "expendi-
ture" as well.7 The chief difficulty seems to be that the intent of Congress
in adding the word "expenditure" is not clear, probably because of
scant testimony and debate on the section.8 There have been only
three other decided cases interpreting this provision.9 In each the defense
attacked the prohibition as an unconstitutional abridgment of the first
amendment,' along with other amendments," or as not describing the
are to be voted for, or in connection with any primary election or political con-
vention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices . . ." 18
U.S.C. § 610 (1952).
2. United States v. International Union United Automobile Workers, UAW-CIO,
138 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Mich. 1956).
3. The original Act of 1907 was confined to national banks and corporations and
only prohibited "money contributions" in relation to certain elections. In 1925, the
term became simply "contribution." The War Labor Disputes Act of 1943 temporarily
included labor unions. In 1947, the Labor Management Relations Act included unions
on a permanent basis, added the word "expenditure", and extended its prohibition
to primaries, conventions, and caucuses.
4. Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882) which found the congressional power
vested by U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
5. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 SrAT'. 159 (later amended by 65
STAT. § 718 (1951), 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1952).
6. S. Rzp. No. 101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 83 (1945).
7. E.g., New York Times, June 21, 1947, p. 2, col. 7, June 29, 1947, p. 1, col. 6;
New York Herald Tribune, July 11, 1947, p. 1, col. 3, July 16, 1947, p. 3, col. 2.
8. United -States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 116, 134 (1948) ; Comment, 57 YALE L.J.
806, 807 n. 6 (1948).
9. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948) ; United States v. Painters Local
481, 172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949) ; United States v. Construction & General Laborers
Local 264, 101 F. Supp. 869 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
10. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 109 (1948) ; United States v. Painters
Local 481, 172 F.2d 854, 856 (2d Cir. 1949); United States v. Construction & Gen-
eral Laborers,.Local 264, 101 F. Supp. 869,, 87.0 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
11. U.S. CONST. amend, V. VI. IX, X, XVII. ' ' "
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violation charged."2.,-The, lack of agreement as to the congressional intent
has led to- a division.,in judicial interpretation.13  Many opinions have,
used this lack of. agreement as an escape route. The courts, believing.
themselves faced with the possibility of deciding, a constitutional question
adversely, 14 have applied the maxim of interpreting a statute so as to
avoid unconstitutionality. 15 Others have declared the section unconsti-
tutional, largely because of its vagueness, by applying the rule that any,
attempt to restrict. the liberties protected by the first amendment must be
justified. by clear public interest threatened by a "clear and present
danger," "I and that legislative judgment, when it restricts first amend-
ment rights,, is not entitled to the same presumption of. validity as in
other regulatory laws. 17 The majority opinion in United States v. CIO i8
reflects the first viewpoint, and the minority opinion the second. Clearly
the case at hand as. well as the other two decided cases follow this ma-
jority opinion. 19
Does the instant case follow United States v. C.I.O. too blindly?
The court found the facts here, to be on all fours 20 with United States v.
Painters Local 481,2  which in turn followed United States v. CIO 22
without distinguishing. That failure to distinguish was not even discussed
in this case, although. it, has been adversely criticized,' 3 and despite, the
12. United States v. Construction & General Laborers Local. 264, 101 F. Supp.
869, 870 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
13. United States v. CIO, 77 F. Supp. 355, 357 (D. D.C.), aff'd, 335 U.S. 106,
112, 153 (1948)'; United States v. Painters Local 481, 79 F. Supp. 516, 519 (D. Conn.
1948), rev'd,.172 F.2d 854, 856, (2d Cir. 1949) ; United States v. Construction & Gen-
eral Laborers Local 264, 101 F. Supp. 869, 876 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
14. United States. v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 120, 121 (1948) ; United States v. Con-
struction. &. General. Laborers. Local.264, 101 F. Supp. 869,.875 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
15.. Ashwander v., Tennessee Valley Authority,. 297. U.S. 288, 346 (1936). But
see, United States v. Sullivan; 332 U.S.
.
689, 693 (1948) ; United States.v. Raynor, 302
U.S. 540, 552 (1938).
16., Schenck v. .United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). But see, United Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
" 17. Thomas v. Collins; 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1944) ; Thornhill v. -Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 95, 96 (1940) ; United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938). But see, United States v. Painters Local 481, 79 F. Supp. 516, 522 (D.
Conn. 1948).
18. 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
19. "Because.of the similarity of the facts before us to those in the CIO decision
• . . we do not feel free to regard the issue of constitutionality. . . . Under the cir-
cumstances we are constrained to hold that the statute did not cover the publication
effected by the defendants. . . ." United States v., Painters Local 481, 172 F.2d 854,
856 (2d Cir. 1949). ". . . We try to follow the law. as laid down by our Supreme
Court and there is no difficulty in doing so here." United States v. International Union
United Automobile Workers, UAW-CIO, 138 F. Supp. 53, 55, 59 (E.D. Mich. 1956).
"Conforming to the view expressed . . . in the CIO case ... the motion . . . of
acquittal . . . is hereby sustained." United States v. Construction & General Laborers
Local Union No. 264, 101 F. Supp. 869, 877 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
20. United States v. International Union United Automobile Workers, UAW-
CIO, 138 F. Supp. 53, 56 (E.D. Mich. 1956).
21. 172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949).
22. 335 U.S. 106 Q948).
23. 49 COLUM. L. Rv. 1152 (1949) ; 7 WASH. & Lsu L. REv. 87 (1950).
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fact that the legislative history seems to speak of this very fact situation
as a violation 24 of Section, 610. Because of its present importance and
the sharp cleavage in opinion, a more definitive interpretation of this
section would be helpful and may be expected.
Thomas E. Eichman
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-OCCUPANCY OF THE FIELD-
SUPERSESSION OF PENNSYLVANIA SEDITION ACT
BY SMITH ACT OF. 1940.
Commonwealth v. Nelson (U.S. 1956).
The defendant was convicted of violating the Pennsylvania Sedition
Act.' The indictment charged acts of sedition against the United States
Government. No evidence was introduced of such acts having been com-
mitted against the State of Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court of the
United States in affirming the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that in view of the evident Congressional intent to pre-empt the field
of sedition, the predominant federal interest in that field, and the danger
of conflict between enforcement of state sedition acts and the administration
of the federal program, the Smith Act of 19402 superseded the Pennsyl-
vania Sedition Act and precluded its enforcement against persons charged
with acts of sedition against the federal government. Commonwealth v.
Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).a
The federal government is one of delegated powers and those powers
not delegated are reserved to the states.4  Where the subject matter of
regulation is national in character and admits of only uniform control,
power to regulate lies exclusively with Congress.5 However, if the subject
matter of regulation does not demand uniformity, either the state or federal
government. may act.6 When such concurrent power exists, and there is
but a partial exercise of its regulatory power by the federal government,
24. See Senator Taft's answers to Senator Pepper's and Senator Taylor's ques-
tions in 93 CONG. REc. 6439, 6447 (1947).
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4207 (Supp. 1955).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952),
3. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
4. U.S. CoNs'r. amend. X.
5. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100(1890) ; Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 125 U.S. 465 (1888) ; Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). But where federal legislation
authorizes state action, such state action is permissible even as to matters which could
otherwise be regulated only by uniform national enactments. Kentucky Whip & Collar
Co. v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 299 U.S. 334 (1937) ; In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891).
6. California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941); Willson v. Blackbird Creek
Marsh: Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245- (1829).
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the states may freely legislate in those areas not covered by federal legis-
lation. 7 But once the United States has legislated in such a manner as to
conflict with the law of a state either specifically 8 or by implication,9 the
state law becomes inoperative and the federal law is supreme. 10 Further,
if Congress has intended to "occupy the field," the state law is automatically
superseded and conflict between the state and federal laws is not neces-
sary." If this intent is not express, it may be implied in the type of law
enacted by Congress. This is the "pre-emption doctrine," which has been
formulated by the Supreme Court to deal with cases involving powers
which the federal government derives from the commerce clause of the
Constitution.' 2 However, it has been applied to strike down a state law
demanding the registration of aliens, 18 due to the effect state regulation of
that subject would have upon international relations. 14 During periods
in which the federal government was not legislating against sedition, the
states' power to so legislate was recognized by the courts. 15
In the instant case, the Supreme Court has applied the rule that
Congress may pass a law which, by implication, will supersede the laws
of the states upon the subject. It is questionable whether this rule, hitherto
applied only to cases falling within the commerce clause and the subject
of international relations, should be extended to further curtail the police
power of the states. The position taken by the majority that the implied
intent of Congress was to occupy the field of sedition appears indefensible
in the face of two factors. First, Congress did not experssly bar state
legislation in the field, in spite of the fact that it knew at the time of the
Smith Act's passage that many states had already so legislated.'0 Secondly,
7. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Illinois, 298 U.S. 155 (1936) ; North-
western Bell Tel. Co. v. Ry. Comm'n., 297 U.S. 471 (1936); Whipple v. Martinson,
256 U.S. 41 (1921); Merchants Exchange v. Missouri, 248 U.S. 365 (1919); Minne-
sota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913).
8. 61 STAT. 146, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1952).
9. Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Pub. Serv. Co., 314 U.S. 498
(1942) ; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) ; Missouri Pac. v. Porter, 273 U.S.
341 (1927); Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line, 272 U.S. 605 (1926); Oregon-Washing-
ton R. & Nay. Co. v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87 (1926) (amendment to meet decision) ;
New York Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917); Adams Express Co. v.
Croninger, 226 U.S. 491 (1912); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204
U.S. 426 (1906).
10. It has been held that there should be a repugnance or conflict which is direct
and positive in order for a state law to be superseded. Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S.
1 (1937); Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 118 (1919); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S.
501 (1911); Missouri K. & T. Ry. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613 (1898); Sinnot v. Daven-
port, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227 (1859).
11. Charleston & Western Carolina Ry. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597
(1915).
12. U.S. CoNsT. art. I § 8, cl. 3.
13. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
14. Cf. Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, United Elec. Workers v. Board, 315 U.S.
740 (1942).
15. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925) ; Commonwealth v. Lazar, 103 Pa. Super. 417, 157 Atd. 701 (1931),
appeal dismissed, 286 U.S. 532 (1932).
16. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3, Committee on the Judiciary, House of
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section 3231 of the Smith Act,' 7 a section commonly employed in federal
criminal statutes, has formerly been interpreted by the Supreme Court
to mean that the states may legislate in the same field, absent an express
congressional prohibition.' s While the states are left free to protect them-
selves against acts of sedition aimed at their own internal government,' 9
the effect of the decision is to render void similar statutes of twenty-three
states which prohibit sedition against the federal government.20
Burchard V. Martin
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SERcHES AND SEIZURES-
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE-STANDING TO OBJECT.
People v. Kitchens (Cal. 1956).
Defendant was found guilty of possessing marijuana. The principal
evidence against him, a small plastic bottle of marijuana taken from his
clothing, was found by the court to have been obtained by a search and
seizure of questionable legality. Defendant was on another's premises
at the time of the search and disclaimed any proprietary interest in the
seized marijuana. On appeal it was held, that since the case had been
tried prior to the California Supreme Court decision rendering illegally
obtained evidence inadmissible, the defendant would now have standing
to object to the admission in evidence Of the marijuana. A new trial was
ordered to determine the legality of the search and seizure. People v.
Kitchens, 294 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1956).'
California has recently adopted the long standing "federal" rule 2
prohibiting the admission of illegally obtained evidence.8 But because
there are many limitations and exceptions to the federal rule as applied
17. The section provides as follows: "The district courts of the United States
shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the states of all offenses
against the laws of the United States. Nothing in this title shall be held to take away
or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several states under the laws thereof."
18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1952).
18. Sexton v. People, 189 U.S. 319 (1903). The interpretation placed by the Su-
preme Court in the Nelson case upon the intent of Congress in enacting the Smith Act
created quite a reaction in Congress. A bill to prohibit future speculation by the Court
upon the Congressional intent was introduced shortly after the decision was handed
down. The bill, H. R. 3, 84th Cong., 2nd sess. (1956), is sponsored in the House by
Congressman Smith, author of the original act, and in the Senate by Senator Mc-
Clellan. It would allow Congressional legislation to supersede state legislation upon
the same subject only when the intent of Congress to do so is expressly stated in the
Act. 102 CONG. Rxc. 7085 (1956).
19. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
20. Digest of the Public Record of Communism in the United States 266-88(1955).
1. People v. Kitchens, 294 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1956).
2. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) ; Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914) ; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
3. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
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in federal courts 4 and in state courts that have adopted-the federal rule,5
California has expressed its intention not to be bound by decisions apply-
ing the federal rule, but rather to develop a workable rule suited to its
own court.8 The general rule is that the right to object to illegally ob-
tained evidence is personal to the one whose rights have been violated 7
and one who claims no proprietary interest in the thing seized or in the
premises from which it has been taken can not object to the admission
of the object in evidence.8 But none of the decisions enunciating that
principle have dealt with the seizure from the defendant's person, while
on another's premises, of an object in which the defendant claims no
proprietary interest. There is, however, authority in state and federal
courts for the decision in the instant case. The necessity for proprietary
interest in the seized object is excused for the purpose of excluding evi-
dence illegally obtained where by statute there can be no-property interest
in the object.9 And there is dictum to the effect that there is no reason
why a defendant's standing to object should turn on the question of
proprietary interest at all. 10 The policy of the exclusionary rule has
always been to exclude evidence obtained by an illegal search either of
the home or of the person." State courts following the federal rule
have long adopted the same policy.' 2
Much has been written pro and con the wisdom of adopting a rule
that would exclude illegally obtained evidence. But once having done
so, California has done well to extend' its benefits to the defendant in the
instant case. For if this defendant were refused standing to object to the
admission of the marijuana in evidence on the ground that he claimed no
4. E.g., Evidence illegally obtained by state officers is admissible in a federal
court if the state officers were not co-operating with federal officers. Bryant v. United
States, 120 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1941) ; United States v. Yee Doo, 41 F.Supp. 939 (D.C.
Cir. 1941). But such illegally obtained evidence is not admissible in federal courts
where, even though there has been no direct co-operation, it is the practice to turn
over to federal authorities offenders violating the federal and state law at the 'same
time. Lowrey v. United States, 128 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1942).
5. E.g., In some states illegally obtained evidence may only be excluded if there
is a motion to suppress it before trial. State v. Conner, 59 Idaho 695, 89 P.2d 197, 201
(1939); State v. Gunkel, 188 Wash. 528, 63 P.2d 376 (1936). Other states allow
the objection to be made during the trial. Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152,
224 S.W. 860 (1920).
6. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905, 915 (1955).
7. Brubaker v. United States, 183 F.2d 894, 897 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Scoggins v.
United States, 202 F.2d 966, 968 (9th Cir. 1940) ; State v. Cairo, 74 R.I. 377, 60 A.2d
841, 845 (1948). California has chosen not to so limit the application of the exclusion-
ary rule. ". . . Whenever evidence is obtained in violation of constitutional guaran-
tees, such evidence is inadmissible whether or not it was obtained in violation of the
particular defendant's constitutional rights." People v. Martin, 45 Cal.2d 755, 290
P.2d 855, 857 (1955).
8. Ingram v. United States, 113 F.2d 966, 968 (9th Cir. 1940); Drake v. State,
920 Okla. Crim. 253, 222 P.2d 770 (1950).
9. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
10. United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
11. Snyder v. United States, 285 Fed. 1, 3 (4th Cir. 1922).
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proprietary interest in it, then only the guilty would benefit where the
very possession of the object is the offense charged. Only one admitting
to possession of the object, and thereby admitting his guilt, would be en-
abled to have the evidence suppressed.
Anthony J. Ryan
EVIDENCE-HEARSAY-CO-DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION IN A
JOINT TRIAL FOR CONSPIRACY.
United States v. Paoli (2d Cir. 1956).
In a joint trial for conspiracy a confession by one of the defendants
which implicated the appellant was admitted in evidence. The jury was
instructed that it was admissible only against the declarant and was not
to be considered in determining the guilt or innocence of the appellant.
The appellant was denied his request to have those parts in the confession
referring to him blackened out. The court of appeals, one Judge dissent-
ing, affirmed the conviction holding that there was no abuse of discretion
by the trial judge. United States v. Paoli, 229 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1956). 1
Co-conspirators are "partners in crime," 2 and therefore all acts,
admissions and declarations of one are imputed to the others.8  For the
acts, admissions and declarations of one to be imputed to the others they
must have occurred during the existence of the conspiracy, and must 'have
been made in furtherance of it.4 The acts of a conspirator done before
the conspiracy was formed are not the liability of his co-conspirator. 5
But if a conspiracy is already in existence and subsequently another
joins it, he is responsible for all acts done by the conspirators prior to his
entering." If, after the substantive crime is completed or abandoned, there
is something still to .be done in order to complete the conspiracy, the
conspirators remain as agents for each other until such time as their
1. United States v. Paoli, 229 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1956).
2. United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608 (1910) ; Van Riper v. United States,
13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir. 1926); People v. Cooper, 326 Mich. 514, 40 N.W.2d 708(1950).
3. Rose v. United States, 149 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Minner v. United States,
57 F.2d 506 (10th Cir. 1932).
4. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949); Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 74 (1942) ". . . . such relations are admissible ... only if there is
proof aliunde that he is connected with the conspiracy." Logan v. United States, 144
U.S. 263 (1892); MoD COS o' EVIDESNcE rule 508(b) (1942).
5. Minner v. United States, 57 F.2d 506 (10th Cir. 1932) ; People v. Fitzgerald, 14
Cal. App. 2d 180, 58 Pac.2d 718 (1936) ; State v. Richetti, 342 Mo. 1015, 119 S.W.2d
330 (1938).
6. State v. Richetti, 342 Mo. 1015, 119 S.W.2d 330 (1938).
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objectives are completed.7 When a conspiracy is over, the acts and
statements of one of its members are admissible as evidence only, against
the declarant, and are inadmissible hearsay as to the other alleged mem-
bers,8 even in a joint trial." The admissibility of evidence against the
declarant in a joint trial which is hearsay as to the others, is within the
discretion of the court. 10 Hence, the general rule has developed that in
a joint trial an admission or confession of one of the defendants, which
is hearsay as to the others, is admissible as long as the court instructs
the jury that it is to be used only in determining the guilt of the declarant
and is to be totally disregarded when considering the fate of the others."
While continuing to give this formal admonition in submitting such
evidence to the jury, our courts have long recognized that ". . . in
nine cases out of ten it is impossible for anyone, lay or legal, to divide
his mind into proof-tight compartments and forget at one time what he
must use at another." 12 Further, in the instant case both the majority
and minority opinions agree that deleting the appellant's name would,
due to the character of the other evidence introduced, serve only to under-
score his guilt.'3 Since ". . . the evidence against Paoli-aside from
Whitley's confession-was by no means overwhelming," 14 the possibility
that its admission influenced the jury in convicting Paoli is great. While
precedent is against the appellant, Judge Frank, in his dissent, warns
that ". . . in criminal actions where life or liberty is at stake, courts
should not adhere to precedents unjust to the accused." '5 An escape
from this dilemma might well lie in a change in the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure requiring a judge to sever the trial of a defendant
7. Murray v. United States, 10 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1926); State v. Larson, 187
Wash. 96, 59 P.2d 1119 (1936).
8. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949); Brown v. United States,
150 U.S. 93 (1893); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892). Especially inad-
missible are narratives of the past acts of other alleged conspirators. United States
v. Goodman, 129 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1942).
9. United States v. Kelinson, 205 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1953) ; Nash v. United States,
54 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1932) ; Hale v. United States, 25 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1928).
10. United States v. Von Clemm, 136 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1943).
11. United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1951) ; United States v. Gott-
fried, 165 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948); Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir.
1932) ; Commonwealth v. Novak, 165 Pa. Super. 576, 69 A.2d 86 (1949). In United
States v. Kelinson, 205 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1953) it was error for the trial judge to ad-
mit such evidence without admonishing the jury. Contra, Hale v. United States, 25
F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1928); United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1951)(dissent). 4 OKLA. L. Rrv. 114 (1951).
12. Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 968 (2d Cir. 1926). "The naive
assumption that all prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury
all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction." Krulewitch v. United
States, 336. U.S. 440, 453 (1949) ; ". . . it is inconceivable that the impression made
upon the minds of the jurors could have been removed by these formal remarks of the
court." Hale v. United States, 25 F.2d 430, 438 (8th Cir. 1928).
13. United States v. Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 321, 324 (2d Cir. 1956).
14. Id. at 322.
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indicted with another when evidence is to be introduced which, while





Taylor v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. (Ill. 1956).
Deceased, with others, plotted and prepared to burn a house to recover
the insurance thereon. The conspirators had spread gasoline throughout
the house when the deceased went inside in order to procure some
articles for his own use. While he was inside the gasoline caught fire
from an unknown cause, whereupon he was burned to death. Plaintiff,
as beneficiary, brought suit to recover on an accident insurance policy,
issued by the defendant, covering the deceased. The policy insured against
bodily injuries sustained "solely through external, violent and accidental
means, directly or independently of all other causes." The lower court
rendered judgment in favor of the defendant.. The Appellate Court of
Illinois, one judge dissenting, reversed and held that the fire rather than
the criminal act was the cause of death, and that the death was the
result of an "accident" within the terms of the policy. Taylor v. John
Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 9 Ill. App. 2d 330, 132 N.E.2d 579
(1956).1
Accident insurance policies are written to cover either accidental
results or the results of an accidental cause or means. The federal courts
and most of the earlier decisions in the state courts have recognized a
distinction between these terms. 2 The words "accidental means" have
been regarded as much narrower in scope than the words "accidental
16. Id. at 324. Judge Frank proposes this rule: "When several defendants are
on trial for criminal conspiracy, if the government seeks to put in evidence an out-
of-court statement by one defendant which is hearsay as to the others (i.e., an out-of-
court statement made after the conspiracy has terminated), then
(a) unless all references to the other defendants can be effectively deleted (so
that the statement will contain no hint of the others' guilt) and unless those references
are deleted,
(b) the trial judge must (1) refuse to admit the statement or (2) sever the trial
of those other defendants."
1. Taylor v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 9 IlI.App.2d 330, 132 N.E.2d
579 (1956).
2. Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491 (1934) ; Order of United
Commercial Travelers v. Shane, 64 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1933) ; Olinsky v. Railway Mail
Ass'n., 182 Cal. 669, 189 Pac. 835 (1920); Szymanska v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 37
Del. (7 Harr.) 272, 183 Atl. 309 (1936) ; Smith v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 219 Mass. 147,
106 N.E. 607 (1914) ; Conti v. Benefit Ass'n of Railway Employees, 103 Pa. Super.
210, 158 Atl. 205 (1931).
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injuries" or the word "accident." a ,Under these decisions it is generally
held that a death or injury, does not result from accidental. means where
it is the natural result of the insured's voluntary act..unaccompanied by
anything unforeseen except the death or injury.4  A number of courts
in this group, having softened this sharp distinction, allow recovery on a
policy containing an accidental means clause if, in the act which precedes
the death or injury, although an intentional act, something unforeseen,
unexpected, and unusual occurs which produces .the death or injury.5
But, even under these decisions recovery has been denied where the in-
sured, by an exercise of ordinary care, should have foreseen the occurrence
because of material facts or circumstances known by him before the
mishap.6 Recognizing that "the attempted distinction between accidental
-results and accidental means will plunge this branch- of the law into a
Serbonian Bog," .7 a great number -of the later decisions in the state
courts have joined with a small .minority of earlier cases in denying-or
repudiating any distinction between the terms "accidental means" and
"accidental results" andin so doing, treat the terms as legally synonymous.8
The rationale of these decisions seems to be: if there has been an acci-
dental result, there necessarily must have been an accidental means, the
two being logically inseparable; 9 terms in insurance policies should be
given ordinary and popular meaning according to common speech and
usage; "0 and, coverage against accidental results was really within the
contemplation of the parties.". Thus it seems that this line of authority
would advocate recovery on all accidental injuries or deaths unless the
insurer has excluded particular kinds by clear exceptions in its policy.
The case under discussion presents a situation in which the insured
was engaged in voluntary, intentional activity. No doubt, an ordinary
3. RiCHARDs, LAW OF INSURANCE § 215 (5th ed. 1952).
4. United Commercial Travelers v. Shane, 64 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1933); Losleben
v. California State Life Ins. Co., 133 Cal. App. 550, 24 P.2d 825 (1933) ; Mutual Ben-
efit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Blanton, 306 Ky. 16, 206 S:W.2d 70 (1947) ; Lawrence
v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co., 113 N.J.L. 265, 174 Ati. 226 (1934).
5. United States Mutual Accident Association v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100 (1889)
Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co. v. Flickinger, 33 F.2d 853 (4th Cir.
1929) ; Schroeder v. Police And Firemen's Ins. Ass'n., 300 Ill.App. 375, 21 N.E.2d
16 (1939) ; McGlinchey v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 80 Me. 251, 14 Atl. 13 (1888).
6. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Kent, 73 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1934) ; Szymanska v. Equit-
able Life Ins. Co., 37 Del. (7 Harr.) 272, 183 Ati. 309 (1936).
7. Mr. Justice Cardozo, dissenting in Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291
U.S. 491 (1934).
8. Wilson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 82 F. Supp. 292 (D. Idaho 1949), aff'd, 178
F.2d 534 (1949) ; Travelers' Protective Ass'n v. Stephens, 185 Ark. 660, 49 S.W.2d
364 (1932); Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Hemenover, 100 Colo. 231, 67 P.2d 80(1937) ; Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mutual Acc. Ass'n., 295 N.Y. 294, 67 N.E.2d
248 (1946).
9. Murphy v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 141 Neb. 41, 2 N.W.2d 576 (1942); Provident
Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Green, 172 Okla. 591, 46 P.2d 372 (1935).
10. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Hemenover, 100 Colo. 231, 67 P.2d 80 (1937)
Griswold v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 107 Vt. 367, 180 Atl. 649 (1935) ; Zinn v.
Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa, 6 Wash.2d 379, 107 P.2d 921 (1940) ; O'Connell
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 220 Wis. 61 264 N.W. 253 (1936).
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prudent man would consider it as inherently dangerous activity. Thus
the fire unexpected as it may have been, was certainly not unusual, nor
should it be considered as unforeseeable. It is hard to see how a court
in a jurisdiction drawing the distinction between "accidental means" and
"accidental results" could permit recovery in this situation and still
recognize the distinction. Yet, the court in this case allowed recovery
without repudiating former Illinois cases drawing the distinction. 12  The
means used by the court to enable it to accomplish such a feat was the
introduction into the controversy of the abstruse doctrine of proximate
cause whereby the accidentally caused fire was isolated from all other
previous transactions and made the accidental means or cause of the
insured's death. Truly the prophesied "Serbonian Bog"!
Michael J. Dempsey
NEGLIGENCE-CoMMUNITY PROPERTY-IMPUTATION TO HUSBAND
OF DIVORCED WIFE'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
Tinker v. Hobbs (Ariz. 1956).
Plaintiff brought an action to recover for personal injuries arising
from a collision between defendant's automobile and an automobile driven
by plaintiff's wife in which he was a passenger. Subsequently the parties
were divorced. At the trial the defendant presented evidence that the
divorced wife had been guilty of contributory negligence. The trial court
entered judgment upon the verdict for the defendant. On appeal the Su-
preme Court of Arizona held that under Arizona divorce law the divorced
wife would have a direct interest in any recovery by the plaintiff, there-
fore, her negligence would have to be imputed to the plaintiff to avoid
unjust enrichment of the divorced wife. Tinker v. Hobbs, 294 P.2d
659 (Ariz. 1956).1
Imputed negligence signifies that one is to be charged with the negli-
gence of another.2 Imputable contributory negligence which will bar a
recovery exists when the person suffering injury, although not chargeable
with negligence, has been exposed to the injury by the negligence of a
person in privity with him.8 The general rule in regard to husband and
wife is that the contributory negligence of one spouse will not be imputed
12. Hutton v. States Accident Ins. Co., 267 Ill. 267, 108 N.E. 296 (1915) ; Ebbert
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 289 Ill.App. 342, 7 N.E.2d 336 (1937) ; Wayne v. Trav-
elers' Ins. Co., 220 Ill.App. 493 (1921).
1. Tinker v. Hobbs, 294 P.2d 659 (Ariz. 1956).
2. Albert v. Maher Bros. Transfer Co., 215 Iowa 197, 243 N.W. 561 (1932).
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to the other merely because of the existence of the marriage relation. 4
However, the contributory negligence of one spouse is imputed to the
other in most of the eight community property states 5 to prevent a
guilty spouse from profiting by, his or her own negligence. The doctrine
of community property is the result of statutes which differ slightly in the
various states, but which have the general underlying principle that all
property acquired by either spouse during the marriage, except that
acquired by gift, devise or descent, shall be deemed the common property
of the husband and wife.6 The majority of states having such statutes
hold that damages received in compensation for personal injuries to either
spouse, or both, are community property,7 and as a corollary of this
doctrine the contributory negligence of one spouse is imputable to the
other and will bar any recovery for damages for personal injuries sustained
by the other spouse.8 ' Nevada and New Mexico, although community
property states, consider damages recovered for personal injuries to one
spouse to be his or her separate property.9 Hence, the contributory negli-
gence of one spouse is not imputed to the other.' When there is a
divorce in a community property state, any community property not
disposed of in the decree of divorce becomes the property of the former
spouses as tenants in common," thus giving each spouse a direct interest
in any damages recovered for personal injuries sustained during the
marriage.
The Arizona Supreme Court in the instant case has rendered a de-
cision which is consistent with its principle that damages recovered for
personal injuries to either spouse are community property. By im-
puting the contributory negligence of one former spouse to the other
4. Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. v. Creek, 130 Ind. 139, 29 N.E. 481 (1892) ; Bartek
v. Glasers Provisions Co 160 Neb. 794, 71 N.W.2d 466 (1955); Peskowitz v. Law-
rence F. Framer, Inc., 103 N.J.L. 415, 144 Atl. 604 (Ct. Err. & App. 1929) ; Anderson
v. State, 203 Misc. 1100, 121 N.Y.S.2d 673 (Ct. Cl. 1952), aff'd, 282 App. Div. 119,
121 N.Y.S.2d 678 (3rd Dep't 1953). Contributory negligence of one spouse will be
imputed to the other if the negligent spouse is the agent of the other. Sloan v. Far-
mer, 168 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1943). In situations where the husband is the driver, the
wife, lacking the right to control her husband's actions, is his guest and therefore his
negligence can not be imputed to her. Swartout v. Van Auken, 132 Misc. 89, 228 N.Y.
Supp. 732 (4th Dep't 1929).
5. Those states having community property laws are: Ariz., Cal., Idaho, La.,
N.M., Nev., Tex., and Wash.
6. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 162, 163, 687 (Deering 1949) ; LA. CIv. CoDe ANN. art. 2334(West Supp. 1953) ; Tax. Rnv. CiV. STAT. art. 4619 (Supp. 1954).
7. Scoville v. Kegler, 27 Cal. App. 2d 17, 80 P.2d 162 (1938) ; Labonte v. David-
son, 31 Idaho 644, 175 Pac. 588 (1918) ; H. T. Cab Co. v. Ginns, 280 S.W.2d 360
(Tex. 1955).
8. Bostick v. Texas & P. Ry., 81 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. 1935). But see, Flores v.
Brown, 39 Cal.2d 622, 248 P.2d 922 (1952) (contributory negligence not imputed
where the negligent spouse died as a result of the accident).
9. Fredrickson & Watson Const. Co. v. Boyd, 60 Nev. 117, 102 P.2d 627 (1940);
Soto v. Vandeventer, 56 N.M. 483, 245 P.2d 826 (1952).
10. King v. Yancey, 147 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1945).
11. Schwartz v. Durham, 52 Ariz. 256, 80 P.2d 453 (1938) ; Fieger v. Fieger, 28
,Cal. App. 2d 736, 83 P.2d 256 (1938) ; Taylor v. Catalon, 140 Tex. 38, 166 S.W.2d
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it has prevented the negligent spouse from profiting by her own wrong,
but on the other hand it has left the injured and innocent spouse without
any legal remedy whatsoever. Thus, the harm resulting is as great as
the good. A better approach to the problem is that of Nevada and New
Mexico which hold as previously noted, that damages recovered for
personal injuries are separate property. Arizona would provide a more
just result by following the interpretation of the Nevada court, since
damages recovered for personal injuries to a spouse are compensation
for violation of a right which is personal only to the injured spouse and
not to both of them.
Francis P. Connors
TAXATION-FEDERAL TAX LIENS-PRIORITY OVER STATUTORY
MECHANIC'S LIEN.
United States v. White Bear Brewing Co. (U.S. 1956).
The United States instituted an action against a successor corpora-
tion and its mortgagee to have corporate realty sold to satisfy federal
tax liens held against a predecessor in title. A statutory mechanic's lien
against the property had been filed, and suit to foreclose the lien was
brought on November 13, 1947. Judgment in favor of the lienor was
entered on April 28, 1949. The lienor purchased the property at the
foreclosure sale and assigned to one Yavitz who conveyed to the de-
fendant. Assessment lists against the predecessor corporation had been
received by the Collector of Internal Revenue on November 17, 1947,
December 17 and 22, 1948. The district court granted a motion to dis-
miss the complaint and the government appealed. The court of appeals
affirmed, holding that the mechanic's lien was superior to the govern-
ment's tax lien.' The Supreme Court with Justices Douglas and Harlan
dissenting reversed per curiam. United States v. White Bear Brewing
Co., 76 Sup. Ct. 646 (1956).2
The United States has a statutory lien on all the property of a
delinquent taxpayer.3 In the absence of a specific statutory declaration
to the contrary, this lien arises at the time the assessment list is received
by the Collector of Internal Revenue for the taxpayer's district.4 Con-
gress has nowhere, save in the case of insolvent taxpayers,5 provided for
the priority of tax liens over other liens. Coupled with this congressional
silence is the fact that the United States has no sovereign common-law
1. United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 227 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1955).
2. United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 76 Sup. Ct. 646 (1956).
3. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3670, 53 STAT. 448.
4. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3671, 53 STAT. 449.
5. Rxv. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. 191 (1952).
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priority.0 The question has been resolved by application of the common-
law rule that the lien which is prior in time is entitled to prior satisfac-
tion.7 But in addition to being prior in time, a lien to be favored over a
tax lien, must have that degree of specificity and perfection which will
render it choate.8 A choate lien is one in which the identity of the
lienor, the amount of the lien, and the property to which it attaches have
been established.9 Because a tax lien is choate as of the time the assessment
list is received by the collector, a° a rival lien in order to be favored must
be perfected before such receipt." In the instant case the lienholder had
recorded his lien for a specific amount and instituted his suit to enforce
the lien before the assessment lists were received. 12  Since the lienholder
is identified, the amount of the lien established, and the liened property
ascertained, upon application of the test outlined in two leading cases 13
the mechanic's lien was choate before the taxes were assessed and conse-
quently before the government's lien could arise.
14
The Court in the instant case has -left the law on this question in a
state of hopeless confusion, more so since the decision was per curiam.
Since no reasons are given for reversing the court below, the test as
to when, if ever, a lien may take precedence over a tax lien is unascertain-
able. In any event the rule that the first choate lien which arises is to
be granted priority is apparently gone. In the words of Justice Douglas:
"The Court apparently holds that . . . , a lien that is specific and choate
under state law, no matter how diligently enforced, can never prevail
against a subsequent federal tax lien, short of reducing the lien to final
judgment." 15
Anthony L. V. Picciotti
6. United States v. Bank of North Carolina, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 29 (1832). See
also Winston-Salem v. Powell Paving Co., 7 F.Supp. 424 (M.D. N.C. 1934); In re
Wyley Co., 292 F.Supp. 900 (N.D. Ga. 1923).
7. Rankin v. Scott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 177 (1827); Macatee, Inc. v. United
States, 214 F.2d 717 (4th Cir. 1954) ; United States v. Greenville, 118 F.2d 963 (4th
Cir. 1941) ; Ersa, Inc. v. Dudley, 134 F.Supp. 627 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
8. United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955) ; United States v. Acri, 348 U.S.
211 (1955); United States v. Liverpool & London & Globe Insurance Co., 348 U.S.
215 (1955) ; United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
9. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954) ; Illinois ex rel. Gor-
don v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946) ; United States v. Albert Holman Lumber Co.,
206 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1953).
10. United States v. Greenville, 118 F.2d 963 (4th Cir. 1941) ; Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. United States, 107 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 310 U.S.
630 (1940); United States v. Standard Brass & Manufacturing Co., 266 S.W.2d 407(Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
11. United States v. Atlantic Municipal Corp., 212 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1954)
Miller v. Bank of America, 166 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1948); Great American Indemnity
Co. v. United States, 120 F.Supp. 445 (W.D. La. 1954); Fleming v. Brownfield, 290
P.2d 993 (Wash. 1955) ; Sams v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 349 Ill. App. 413, 111
N.E.2d 172 (1953).
12. United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 76 Sup. Ct. 646 (1956) (dissenting
opinion).
13. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954) ; Illinois ex rel. Gor-
don v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946).
14. See note 4, supra.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-EXCLUSIVENESS OF
REMEDY-FAILURE TO PLEAD A REJECTION
OF THE ACT.
Hyzy v. Pittsburgh Coal Co. (Pa. 1956).
The plaintiff, as administratrix of her husband's estate, brought a
wrongful death action against his employer alleging the defendant's
neglect of a statutory duty. The trial court sustained the defendant's
demurrer. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that where the
complaint alleged a fatal injury in the course of employment, failure to
allege a rejection of the Workmen's Compensation Act, was tantamount
to pleading that the parties had accepted the act as part of the employment
contract, and the complaint was therefore demurrable. Hyzy v. Pitts-
burgh Coal Co., 384 Pa. 316, 121 A.2d 85 (1956). 1
The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act makes the remedy
given by the act exclusive,2 and the courts of Pennsylvania have applied
this provision literally.8 The act provides that "In every contract of
hiring . . . expressed or implied . . . , it shall be conclusively pre-
sumed that the parties have accepted the provisions" of the act unless
written notice is given to the contrary. 4  Therefore, plaintiff-employees
must affirmatively plead rejection of the act before they can proceed with
another remedy." The employer-defendant's violation of a statute is not
of itself enough to excuse the injured employee from proceeding under
the act,8 although claims under the act by employees guilty of a similar
infraction have been denied. 7 Regarding the legislative will, it has been
suggested that the protection of the Workmen's Compensation Act ought
not to be given the employer who contravenes a statutory command while
it is denied the employee who does the same.8 Lincoln v. Nat. Tube
1. Hyzy v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 384 Pa. 316, 121 A.2d 85 (1956).
2. Acceptance of the act ". . . shall operate as a surrender by the parties thereto
of their rights to any form or amount of compensation or damages for any injury or
death occurring in the course of employment, or to any method of determination there-
of, other than as provided, in article three of this act. Such agreement shall bind the
employer and his personal representatives, and the employee, his or her wife or hus-
band, widow or widower, next of kin, and other dependents." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77
§ 481 (Supp. 1955).
3. McIntyre v. Strausser, 365 Pa. 507, 76 A.2d 220 (1950) ; Jackson v. Gleason,
320 Pa. 545, 182 AtI. 498 (1936).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 461 (Supp. 1955).
5. Hyzy v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 384 Pa. 316, 121 A.2d 85 (1956) ; Cappozoli v.
Stone & Webster Eng. Co., 352 Pa. 183, 42 A.2d 524 (1945). See Blair v. Langhead,
108 Pa. Super. 407, 165 Atl. 58 (1933) (must plead rejection according to statutory
provisions).
6. Welsch v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp., 303 Pa. 405, 154 Atl. 716 (1931).
7. E.g., Walkofski v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 278 Pa. 84, 122 Atl. 238 (1923).
8. "It is not likely that the Legislature, in passing the Workmen's Compensation
Act, intended to 'bar from compensation employees who violate safety laws and yet
immunize employers from liability in trespass actions when they ignore the same safety
laws. If violation of a safety law takes the claimant out of the course of employment,
a disregarding of statutory requirements by the employer must remove him from the
protection of the Workmen's Compensation Law." Hyzy v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 384
Pa. 316, 121 A.2d 85, 89 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
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Co.9 and King v. Darlington Brick & Mine Co.,10 both involving the
illegal employment of minors, have been cited as examples of an employer's
illegal act which permitted the plaintiff to bring an action in trespass."
After these decisions, the legislature amended the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act to include illegally employed minors. 12
Eliminating the illegally employed minor as an exception to the
exclusiveness of the Workmen's Compensation Act indicates the legisla-
tive intent to broaden the applicability of the act rather than to provide
exceptions. Thus the instant case, standing for the pervasiveness of the
act, is correctly decided. Those decisions which would tend to bring the
justice of the instant case into question take a narrow view of the scope
of employment. This view should be overcome, as the Legislature prob-
ably intended, 3 by affording the act the liberal construction it requires as
remedial legislation.' 4 To continue the doctrine of the cases which deny
the remedy of workmen's compensation to employees who violate the law
is not to cause a rent in the integrity of decision; on the contrary it is to
preserve the program. The law should not aid a cause based on an illegal
act. 15 Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the employer-wrongdoer
does not get the benefit of his wrong. The real benefit under the statute
is conferred upon the claimant who receives an easy remedy. The law-
makers have decided that the common good requires this benefit to be
paid for by the surrender of the claimant's common-law right of action.
This is a matter of legislative determination which the court has rightly
enforced in this case.
George S. Forde, Jr.
ZONING-NoN-CONFORMING UsE-REQUESTED
CHANGE TO LESS UNDESIRABLE USE
O'Neill v. Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment (Pa. 1956).
The purchaser of a property used as a commercial garage, a non-
conforming use antedating the applicable zoning ordinance, applied to the
Department of Licenses and Inspections for a permit to alter the building
for use as a private garage and small ballet school. The permit was denied
9. 268 Pa. 504, 112 Atl. 73 (1920).
10. 284 Pa. 227, 131 At. 241 (1925).
11. Hyzy v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 382 Pa. 316, 121 A.2d 85 (1956) (dissenting
opinion). But see Welsch v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp., 303 Pa. 405, 154 Atil.
716 (1931).
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 672 (Supp. 1955). See Fritsch v. Pennsylvania Golf
Club, 355 Pa. 384, 50 A.2d 207 (1947).
13. The act is to cover ". . . all accidents occurring within this Commonwealth."
'PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § I (Supp. 1955).
14. Cf. Dun v. Trego, 279 Pa. 518, 124 Atl. 174 (1924) ; Pater v. Superior Steel
Co., 263 Pa. 244, 106 Atl. 202 (1919).
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on the ground that the proposed use was not permitted in that district.
She then appealed to the Zoning Board of Adjustment for a variance
which, after a -public hearing, was granted. A protesting neighbor ap-
pealed to the court of common pleas, which reversed the board holding
that the applicant had not shown the "unnecessary hardship" prerequisite
to such a grant. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed
and held that since appellant was required, in the absence of a variance,
to convert the premises to a conforming use at an inordinate cost, the
requisite hardship was shown, thus justifying reinstatement of the board's
order granting the variance. O'Neill v. Philadelphia Zoning Board of
Adjustment, 384 Pa. 379, 120 A.2d 901 (1956).1
A non-conforming use is one which antedates a zoning ordinance and
is thus permitted to continue, although similar uses may not be inaugurated
in the given area.2 Many zoning ordinances expressly permit a change
from one non-conforming use to another more desirable non-conforming
use, without necessitating a variance, while prohibiting any change to a
less desirable use." The ordinance applicable to the instant case 4 adopts
the latter provision but remains silent on the former. The court has
construed the ordinance to require an application for a variance to make
the change sought." This is the more important and the most frequently
used method " of circumventing the literal terms of an ordinance to avoid
undue hardship upon an individual property owner. Its conditions are
substantially the same everywhere.7 The primary condition and the only
one in question here is "unnecessary hardship." The courts have often
held that mere financial hardship will not justify the granting of a variance.8
But this holding is usually found in cases wherein the applicant hopes to
secure a large profit,9 whereas here the motive is to avoid a prohibitive
loss.
1. O'Neill v. Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment, 384 Pa. 379, 120 A.2d
901 (1956).
2. Beyer v. Mayor and Council, 182 Md. 444, 34 A.2d 765 (1943).
3. Abbadessa v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 134 Conn. 28, 54 A.2d 675 (1947);
Beyer v. Mayor and Council, 182 Md. 444, 34 A.2d 765 (1943) ; Buffalo v. Roadway
Transit Co., 303 N.Y. 453, 104 N.E.2d 96 (1952).
4. PHILADELPHIA, CODE OF ORDINANCES, tit. 14, § 104 (1956).
5. Darling v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 357 Pa. 428, 54 A.2d 829 (1947).
6. Freeman v. Board of Adjustment, 97 Mont. 342, 34 P.2d 534 (1934). The other
device is an exception. "An exception in a zoning ordinance is one allowable where
facts and conditions detailed in the ordinance as those upon which an exception may
be permitted, are found to exist." Deveraux Foundation Zoning Case, 351 Pa. 478, 41
A.2d 744, appeal dismissed, 326 U.S. 686 (1945).
7. The applicant must show that the literal enforcement of the ordinance will re-
sult in unnecessary hardship to him, that granting the variance will not be contrary
to the public interest, and that granting it will be to observe the spirit of the ordi-
nance. See Doolings Windy Hill, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 371 Pa. 290,
89 A.2d 505 (1952) ; Burkhardt v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 191 Va. 606, 66 S.E.2d
565 (1951).
8. Comley v. Boyle, 115 Conn. 406, 162 Atl. 26 (1932) ; Real Properties, Inc. v.
Board of Appeals, 319 Mass. 180, 65 N.E.2d 199 (1946).
9. Easter v. Mayor and City Council, 195 Md. 395, 73 A.2d 491 (1950); Stolz
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The instant decision holds that financial hardship can satisfy the
requirement of unnecessary hardship for the granting of a variance in
cases wherein the applicant wishes to change a non-conforming use to a
more desirable non-conforming use. But it does not specify how much
of a financial expenditure is necessary to constitute unnecessary hardship.
Hence, although the court has settled the instant case, it has not given
clear guideposts for similar cases arising in the future. Mr. Justice Bell,
concurring specially, asserts that a change such as the one made here is
a matter of right and that no variance proceeding is necessary. This would
appear to be the better interpretation of the ordinance in question, and the
ground upon which the case should have been decided.'"
Joseph M. Smith
10. The adoption of the principle urged by Justice Bell would necessitate the over-
ruling of the Darling case. Darling v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 357 Pa. 428, 54
A.2d 829 (1947). It appears that the court, which was there concerned with a request
to resume a non-conforming use, which had been abandoned, as a non-conforming
use of a lower grade, misinterpreted the ordinance.
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